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[REDACTED]  
Washington, D. C.  
12 February 1951

Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong  
Editor, Foreign Affairs  
58 East 68th Street  
New York 21, New York

Dear Ham:

I don't know what we can do about Jimmy as he is not easy to fit into our scheme of things while at the same time I think he has real value. I shall talk this over with you in more detail when we next get together. I shall be in New York over the week-end and hope to see you then.

So far I have missed the Countess Dönhoff. If she is still in New York I might try to see her next Sunday.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles

AWD:at

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FOREIGN



AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG  
EDITOR

58 EAST SIXTY-EIGHTH STREET  
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.  
CABLE ADDRESS: FORAFFAIRS, NEW YORK

January 31, 1951

Allen W. Dulles, Esq.  
1718 H Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen:

I have heard from Jimmy, but only to say that he had not heard from you. Maybe by now you are in direct contact.

I don't know whether you saw [redacted] when she was in Washington last week. If not, let me know when you will be next in New York, and I'll try to bring you together.

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As ever,  
*ham*

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1718 H Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C.  
27 January 1951

Mr. Hamilton F. Armstrong  
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.  
58 East 68th Street  
New York City, New York

Dear Ham:

I appreciate your letter of January 22 with  
the various suggestions of persons in whom we might  
be interested.

I am looking forward to seeing [redacted]

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Please let me know if you hear anything from  
Jimmy.

Sincerely,

*[Signature]*  
Allen W. Dulles

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December 16, 1950

[Redacted]  
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Dear Mr. Armstrong:

I have been writing tonight a letter to my distinguished friend, [Redacted] STAT  
[Redacted] answering his recent letter. While doing it, I have thought that you might be perhaps interested in some of my considerations. Of course, you understand that I have no inside information and must build up my appreciation of the present situation on such materials which are publicly available. But the life in Tuscaloosa, far away from great events, has the value of a monastic life - one has plenty of time for meditations.

Here are some of my considerations which I have sent to [Redacted]

1. I would not accept any more a bet that the general war may be avoided now or next year. I take this attitude for two reasons: of course, the Far Eastern events might degenerate into a general war, but independently of the Far Eastern situation the re-armament of Germany might precipitate the events in Europe. If the Soviet leaders have risked the possibility of a general war because of Korea, will they quietly observe the re-building of the German armed forces whose value they know from the experience of the two past wars? Will they accept the prospect of being cut off from the Western European human and material potential by such an army which is bound to become sooner or later a fully developed armed force? This issue might appear to them as much more vital and immediate than the whole of China.

Suppose that such a general war would materialize. Then the problem politically will be much more difficult than that of Nazi Germany. The Nazis with their stupid theory of racial superiority could hardly expect to appeal to foreign nations. The Soviet Union has better assets.

2. First of all, they may count on quite a serious and sincere Fifth Column in the West of continental Europe. There the ignorance of the abyss dividing the Soviet theory from the Soviet practice is still enormous. Having investigated for the last two years Soviet publications as to the position of a Soviet educated man, a Soviet worker and a Soviet peasant, I know how that regime might be vulnerable because of the obvious discrepancies between the alluring theory and the grim facts which are proved by the Soviet publications. But how many French, Italian or other workers, peasants or intellectuals do know it, and how many of them were confronted with direct Soviet sources instead of Western interpretations which they might dismiss as propaganda?

Moreover, many Western intellectuals having lost faith in the Western values and not having the moral courage of agnostics, look desperately for some moral and intellectual certitude. They delude themselves that the Soviet doctrine assures to them the comfort of the absence of doubts. Examples: Picasso or Joliot. Both the working classes and the intellectuals might learn the truth by actual experience, but it might be too late. Should they be informed beforehand by an ample distribution of the Soviet labor laws, collective farming laws, instructions of the Central Committee in regard to intellectuals, etc.?

3. My next worry is this - have the Western European nations recovered from their war fatigue? Will Frenchmen, Italians or Belgians fight or will they collapse like in 1940? If they knew that the surrender would not improve their lot, they might fight out of despair, having no choice. But do they know really what means the extension of the Soviet-like régime to their daily lives?

4. The problem of some Eastern European satellites is wrthwhile watching. I would not rely too much on the reports of the émigrés who are in good faith

but indulge sometimes in wishful thinking. I heard recently a lecture given by a Polish émigré who said textually that the whole population of Warsaw would do anything at the order of the Voice of America, including leaving the city within 24 hours. Do you see several hundred thousand people leaving their city at a radio instruction?

In regard to the Poles and the Czechs there is one risk. They might be the victims of the Soviet propaganda that the next war would be waged to prevent German re-militarization. If you were interested in this particular aspect of the question, ask someone who knows Polish to translate for you the text of an appeal addressed by the Polish Catholic writers to the French intellectuals. The text was published in the Catholic daily: "Słowo Powszechnie" on October 23, 1950. They are most emphatic in protesting against the German re-armament and in expressing their fears for the Oder-Neisse line. They were not testifying before a Polish court, they were not, literally speaking, cooked up; I know some of them. Those whom I know are risking daily their personal freedom publicly opposing the régime. One of them writes me letters of such a nature that very few individuals would dare to write in such a manner, being behind the Iron Curtain. Yet this man, who knows that he is doomed and openly accepts the risks, signed the appeal. This shows, by the way, how unwise it was on the part of the Western statesmen to accept Stalin's idea of the Oder-Neisse line; but he knew what he was doing, especially in view of the post-war distrust of the Germans on the part of the Soviet Union.

5. Doing my research I re-read Lenin's Imperialism and Stalin's statements on the same subject. Lenin was not a Western European like Marx. This makes the whole difference. Being an Eastern European, he advanced the theory of haves and have-nots. He had in mind not social classes, but whole nations. For him a few rich nations were exploiting the immense majority of mankind

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composed of have-nots. He admits even that the proletariat of the have nations participates in sharing the benefits of that exploitation. Stalin developed many times the same theme, addressing himself to the Slavs, the Asiatics and colored races. There is a slogan much more powerful than any Communist Manifesto of Marx and Engels. If I may make a suggestion, I think that it would be useful to have someone write an article on this question for your excellent review. This aspect is important, because the Russians hold there a dynamic asset in regard to the Far East, Middle East and perhaps also Eastern Europe. It is worthwhile to know it and to counteract it skillfully.

For those and other reasons I think that this time we face an enemy politically much more dangerous than Hitler and Co.

With renewed best wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

STAT

2 JAN 1951

Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong  
 Editor, FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
 58 East Sixty-Eighth Street  
 New York 21, New York

Dear Ham:

Thanks very much for your letter of 19 December 1950, with which you sent me the reports you had received on the political implications of the last elections. I have passed these on to Bill Langer and suggested that, after they have served their purpose, he send them to others in the agency who would be interested. I appreciate receiving these.

With very best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

*Stamps given to 2 Jan 51*

William H. Jackson

LBK:rm 1 Jan 50  
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